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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: With this paper, we aim to provide an insight on the regulatory reforms on 
corporate governance, brought about, by its ineffectiveness in the global financial crisis.  
Design/Approach/Methodology: To this effect we compared accounting ratios over a 
period of 10 years - 5 years prior and during financial crisis (i.e. 2006-2010) and 5-years 
post regulatory reforms on governance (i.e. 2014-2018) -using panel data of ratios for 
profitability, liquidity and efficiency. 
Findings: The general trend in the banks was that profitability and efficiency decreased 
drastically in the post regulatory period, contrary to liquidity, which increased, as higher 
capital buffers were imposed on banks.  
Practical Implications: This study is important because the burden of regulations is 
detrimental to the performance of public banks in the EU Mediterranean region. There are 
several arguments that the burden of compliance is becoming very costly and this is 
negatively affecting their profitability and efficiency. 
Originality/Value: These findings are of interest to economists and policy makers within the 
European Mediterranean region.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, regulators have been increasing their focus on corporate 
governance practices within banks. This is due to the increase in the  number 
of bankruptcies which they  deemed was the cause of absent or poor corporate 
governance regulations. Kirkpatrick, (2009), reported that the global financial 
crisis can be blamed on deficiency and vulnerability in corporate governance 
practices. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, Schapiro (2009), 
argued that: “many of the problems leading to our economic crisis can be laid at 
the door of poor corporate governance. Too many boards failed in their 
primary function of diligently overseeing management. As a result, too many 
managers took on too much risk and made decisions that were too focused on the 
short-term.” 
 
The Basel Committee reports that good corporate governance is important for 
a sound financial system. Refining corporate board structures, with respect to their 
size and setting, has been one of the primary issues in the corporate governance 
framework, developed by international authorities in recent years (EU Commission 
Communication, 2003; Basel Committee, 2006). These changes in corporate 
governance raise questions on, for example, what type of ownership or board size 
are better for banks to improve performance (Grima, 2012). Heidrick and Struggles 
(2014) reported that although it is extremely important to follow corporate 
governance practices it should not be the main and only focus of an entity and thus 
not allowing enough time for the board and management to strive to achieve better 
performance. While Lux and Piechock (2015) argued that, the burden of 
compliance and reporting is becoming too time- consuming. 
 
Therefore, in this paper we aim to provide an insight on the regulatory reforms on 
corporate governance, brought about, by its ineffectiveness in the global financial 
crisis. We focus on EU since it has been involved in a severe sovereign debt crisis 
that puts at risk even the very existence of the Union and its currency in their current 
forms (Andor, 2014). In fact, a study on EU governance carried out by Heidrick 
and Struggles (2014), suggested that many European companies need to move from 
pure compliance to create dynamic and flexible governance. More specifically, 
our focus is on Public Banks within the EU Mediterranean region group of six 
southern European Union member states Italy, Greece and Spain, France and 
Cyprus and Portugal, which although not in the Mediterranean is closely related. 
This specific area is selected because these were the EU countries that were mostly 
affected by the crisis.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Basel Committee on Banking (BCBS) defines corporate governance as:  
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“a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders which provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance” (BCBS, 2010). 
 
The main aim of corporate governance is to lay down guidelines to ease decision 
making in line with the objectives. It even defines the roles, duties and 
responsibilities of the directors and investors. Furthermore, corporate governance is 
strengthened through incentives (explicit and implicit) provided in executive 
contracts to align the interests of shareholders with the managers of an entity 
(Leech, 2003). A shareholder is entrusting his assets in someone else’s hands, 
hoping to receive back those assets together with an extra return for the risk taken. 
 
2.2 History of Corporate Governance 
 
Early corporate finance textbooks mention the formation of corporate governance 
with the development of the East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company 
and other dominant companies launched in the 16th-17th century (Cheffins, 2012). 
It was then seen as the share of ownership patterns, entailing processes of 
managerial accountability, shareholders’ rights and board structure conveyed 
through Corporate Governance (Morck, 2005). 
 
Post-World War II, the U.S economy was experiencing a boom and companies 
where benefiting from a rapid growth. However, corporate governance was not 
being followed because managers led and took decisions and the directors and 
shareholders followed. The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (FSEC) 
started to treat managerial accountability as part of a regulatory requirement in 
1974, after Penn Central went bankrupt due to directors failing to discover 
misconduct by managerial executives (Schwartz, 1976). Later in the 1990’s 
awareness on governance increased after further managerial failures in companies. 
 
The 2008 Global Economic Crisis increased the efforts to strengthen corporate 
governance and incentivised corporate managers to strive to earn interest for 
shareholders. After the subside of Bear Stearns, Countrywide and Lehman 
Brothers, the U.S president Barack Obama (2009), in one of his speeches, said that 
the U.S economy is severely compromised due to irresponsibility and greed of 
some people. The Dodd-Frank Act was founded in 2010 to “restore public 
confidence by increasing accountability and transparency between shareholders 
and corporate managers”. This was done by imposing restrictions on managers 
and clearly set out executive compensation schemes (CEBS, 2009). 
 
Schapiro (2009) argued that the main cause of our economic crisis is poor 
corporate governance, where the board failed in diligently overseeing management 
and due to this, high risk and bad decisions were made. Similarly, an OECD report 
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by Kirkpatrick (2009), deduced that the financial crisis is a pure example of 
failures and weaknesses in corporate governance frameworks. 
 
2.3 Importance of Governance in Banks 
 
Corporate governance is an important concept in a financial institution as it 
dictates how authority is spread. Additionally, it is also vital for the suitable 
functioning of the banking sector and the economic growth (Levine, 1997). 
Corporate governance also allocates authority and states the responsibilities that 
regulates how the bank carries out its commerce and activities that are controlled 
by the board of directors and senior management. Supervisors are there to ensure 
sound corporate governance practices. Thus, ensuring the ability to meet objectives 
keeping within the risk appetite of the board and thereby attaining better 
performance. 
 
Banks are very important for the economy since they act as financial intermediaries 
between savers and borrowers. That is by distributing excess resources from savers 
to borrowers, in return earning interest on capital borrowed and therefore 
encouraging economic growth. The bank’s financial stability is vital, since serious 
problems, including defects in the governance framework could threaten the 
financial system of the whole economy (OECD, 2006).  
 
Morgan (2002) argued that the issue of information asymmetries between 
investors, depositors and senior management still exists in banks. Furthermore, lack 
of transparency in banks increases the agency problem. For instance, shareholders 
and depositors would not be able to monitor the banks managers, having less 
information in hand. The significance of banks in the development and the 
prosperity of an economy, make it critical for the governments, globally, to force 
regulatory requirements on banks. This process can be considered as a 
supplementary corporate governance mechanism (Levine, 2004).  
 
During the financial crisis governance mechanisms gained higher importance 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). The Board of directors, in banks, play a key role in clinching 
effective governance. Members on the board supervise managers’ decisions and 
behaviour to guide them on strategy planning and execution as well as allocate 
essential resources to the entity. The role of the board, in the banking industry, 
takes on special importance since higher complexity, opacity, regulation and 
greater asymmetric information exists (BCBS, 2017). 
 
2.4 Regulations Before Crisis in EU 
 
Pre-Global Financial crisis, corporate governance was very limited. Examples 
of such a framework in EU countries was the restrained concentration of bank 
ownership. Such restrictions were vague for example, purchasing a large percentage 
of shares without government’s approval was prohibited (Fernandes et al., 2016). 
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The OECD Principles (1999) were the main project tackled by an inter-
governmental organisation, to enhance the predominant factors for a good 
corporate governance system. Since 2000, the tasks of the EU have, in general, 
concentrated on designing a system in which accountable and effective firms report 
to accountable shareholders. It was, therefore, inclined to nurture shareholders’ 
rights and responsibilities. This was implemented through Basel I. Also, BCBS 
had laid out a regulation regarding the number of independent directors on the 
board. Additionally, the Sarbanes - Oxley act of 2002, required that the boards of 
audit committees should only be made up of independent, external directors. 
 
The 2003 Green Paper, (Appendix I) was a substantial revaluation of corporate 
governance and proceedings of legal harmonisation that were derived from the 
High-Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002) report bespoke by the 
European Commission in 2002. It aided in encouraging distinct regulatory 
initiatives, such as the 2004 Transparency Directive and the 2007 Shareholder 
Rights Directive (Appendix I) as well as European Commission Recommendations 
on remuneration and board formation and roles. The one-tier board structure was 
the most common in European countries. It related to one single board comprising 
of both executive and non-executive directors. All the directors had the same aims 
and objectives and they were accountable for all the activities of the bank. The one-
tier board structure was dominant in UK, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, France and 
Italy (Maassen, 2002). The directors made sure that control systems and financial 
reporting agreed with the law (Weil et al., 2002). 
 
Another regulation was the leadership structure, were in the unitary board system, 
the role of the CEO and the chairman of the board was performed by the same 
individual (Hagendorff et al., 2013). France, for example, required that leadership 
should be combined. The law was changed, allowing entities to choose between 
combining or separating the roles of CEO and the chairman in the unitary board 
(Vienot, 2002). In contrast, the most common practice in both Italy and Spain was 
to combine the duty of leadership structure thus balancing the potential of the CEO 
and the chairman (Weil et al., 2002). 
 
However, such regulatory framework was not enough as banks managed to find 
loopholes in the system in addition to taking excessive risks. This was a proof 
that the regulations on governance at that time were impotent. The massive debt 
crisis and later the collapse of the financial system, pointed towards the need for 
further regulations (Erkens et al., 2012). 
 
2.5 Regulatory Pressures After the Crisis in EU 
 
The Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession led to the inception of the G20, 
IMF reform, and Basel III (Eichengreen, 2011). Most of the regulatory reforms 
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focused on disclosure and compliance. The EU launched several policies that 
tackle distinct issues, including the following: 
  
➢ Enhancing board effectiveness  
➢ Enhancing corporate transparency  
➢ Building shareholder stewardship and engagement  
➢ Protecting shareholder rights (Dallas and Pitt-Watson, 2016). 
 
The main goal was to improve financial supervision after the crisis. European 
financial supervision (EFS) reform emerged in October 2008. A high-Level Expert 
Group on EFS was set up to scrutinize the creation of a more integrated and 
efficient system of financial supervision for Europe, as well as strengthening 
collaboration between European supervisors and their international peers 
(European Commission, 2008). After a series of recommendations based on the De 
Larosier Report, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was to be led by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The idea was to analyse threats to financial 
stability, discharge warnings and observe their utilization. The European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS), had supervisory responsibility on different parts of 
the financial system, in order to gather a micro insight from diverse areas in 
financial supervision (European Commission, 2009). 
 
Following the crisis’s excessive risk-taking, followed by many bankruptcies, many 
investors lost confidence and pulled out their money from banks. EU wanted to 
gain back the confidence lost in the market, so the Institute of International Finance 
presented a prospectus on developing compensation policies to mitigate excessive 
risk-taking and keeping transparency in the market (IIF, 2008). The compensation 
incentives are to be aligned with shareholders and profitability of the entity. 
However, this self-regulation effort to gain back confidence came too late and the 
impact of the crisis hit badly. 
 
The argument behind the failure of governance was inadequate compensation 
systems and transparency. In April 2009, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), in 
the G20 summit developed nine principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
addressed to national regulators in the European countries (FSB, 2010). These 
principles revolve around effective governance compensation focusing on the 
duties of the board in planning and monitoring adequate compensation systems, 
with a task for independent input from risk management experts inside the entity 
(United Nations, 2010). These principles were followed by a set of 
Implementation Standards, issued by the Financial Supervisory Board (FSB) to 
give clear guidelines on implementation of compensation governance, disclosure 
to stakeholders and structure. These are transposed into: 
 
➢ Effective and independent board oversight of remuneration policies and 
application. 
➢ The need to maintain a sound capital base, whilst delivering fair 
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compensation based on the overall performance of the firm. 
➢ Risk and compensation structure alignment, including vesting, 
clawback arrangements and deferral. 
➢ Restrictions on guaranteed bonuses. 
➢ Intensify public disclosure and transparency of compensation; and 
➢ Augment supervisory oversight of compensation, incorporating 
corrective measures when needed (FSB, 2009). 
 
Corporate Governance rules were also reviewed from BCBS’s end. These provided 
a convention for frequent collaboration between the national Central Banks and 
the ECB In November 2008. The Basel Committee wanted to enhance the Basel 
II framework to impose stricter rules on risk and capital management. The 
framework consisted of three pillars; were Pillar two (supervisory review process) 
focused on clear guidelines regarding risk assessment and risk control by the board 
and the management of a bank (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009).  
 
These are implemented under the Principles for Sound compensation practices. In 
the EU the Committee of European Banking Supervision (ECBS) required 
financial institutions to implement these principles by the end of quarter three in 
2009. The principles focus on the following areas: 
 
➢ Aligning individual objectives with the company. 
➢ Higher transparency with all stakeholders. 
➢ Greater governance on decision-making and oversight. 
➢ Better performance practices. 
➢ Guidance on the structure and form of remuneration (United Nations, 2010). 
 
Basel III was then introduced to improve the regulation, supervision and risk 
management within the banking sector (Elliot, 2010). The ultimate aim, was to 
increase the idea of improving corporate governance, more specifically, the 
capacity of the board of directors to exercise independent judgement, diligence and 
skills, monitoring management based on fundamental factors, enhancing 
transparent reporting and ensuring continuous education and training to be 
implemented inside the bank. (Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, 
2010).  
 
However, Parker and Gupta (2015) argued that regulators need to be careful as they 
are putting excessive pressures on banks by trying to solve things in a short-term. 
This might create a bank drain in the long term. Hagendorff et al. (2014), suggested 
separating the roles of a CEO and chairman, to make a bank more independent 
whilst reducing conflict of interest. Gender diversity was being given greater 
importance, as it was considered to lead to better performance when having a 
mix of gender in the board (European commission, 2012). In fact, France and 
Spain required that forty percent of the board had to be made up of females by 2017 
    G. Gauci, S. Grima 
  
367  
 
and 2015 respectively. Italy required that thirty percent of the board was female by 
2015 (Davies, 2014). 
 
2.6 Good Governance 
 
The Pillars for successful corporate governance are: fairness, accountability, 
transparency, leadership, assurance and stakeholder management. These are ideal 
to form strong relationships between stakeholders, which include shareholders, the 
board, managers, staff, clients and regulators. Gitau (2015) stated that, “Having a 
clear understanding of the principles and practices of good governance will 
enhance the performance of both the individual and the organisation.” 
 
Good corporate governance features also in good credit ratings given by credit 
rating agencies. Hence, it influences behaviour of management and encourages fair 
dealing with all stakeholders. Quality of disclosure, affiliate dealings and 
transparency are some of the qualitative features Fitch Ratings uses in its rating 
analysis. Stock markets, shareholders and creditors will reward a company that has 
better governance and higher liquidity. This increases share price premiums (which 
is the aim of the shareholder) relative to its peers and making more credit available 
at a lower cost. Ultimately, the cost of capital will be lower for companies with 
good reputations for fair dealings, all other things being equal (OECD, 2012). 
 
2.7 Performance 
 
Performance relates not only to profitability. It is vital to include other aspects such 
as: the quality of assets, the funding capacity (liquidity) and the efficiency in 
production (European Central Bank, 2010). The key drivers of a bank’s 
performance are earnings, efficiency, risk-taking and leverage. 
 
2.8 What is Profitability? 
 
It is important to distinguish between profitability and performance, as sometimes 
these two are used interchangeably (Tosetti, 2007). Tosetti (2007), noted that 
there are four components for profitability to quantify true banking performance. 
These are: 1) provision for loan losses, 2) tax, 3) profits and losses on financial 
instruments and other items.  
 
Profitability is the overall efficiency of the company. It is the ability of the business 
to earn a profit. Analyses of Profitability are done through financial statements, that 
is, profit and loss account, cash flow statement and statement of financial position. 
The financial statements give information with respect to efficiency, solvency, 
market prospects and profitability of the company (CFI, 2018). A bank earns a 
return by giving out loans, from interest income generated from investments in 
securities and other financial products and fees or commissions charged to 
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service customers. Furthermore, commercial banks generate additional revenue 
from foreign exchange activities (Fraser and Rose, 2002). 
 
2.9 Measures for Profitability 
 
Previous studies have made use of the Return on Equity (ROE), the Return on 
Assets (ROA), the Net Interest Margin and Profit before Interest and Tax, to study 
the performance and profitability of a bank (Stepanova and Ivantsova, 2012). 
ROE portrays the effectiveness of a bank on turning shareholders’ funds into 
profit. ROE is calculated as net profit after tax to shareholders capital. It measures 
the profits earned with the shareholders capital (Mashamba, 2018). ROA is 
calculated by taking net profit after tax divided by the total assets. ROE ignores 
financial opportunity and risks associated with it (Athanasoglou et al., 2006, 
European Central Bank, 2010). Therefore, ROE is insensitive to risk. Furthermore, 
other risk factors such as solvency position and the ratio of risky assets of the entity 
are not taken into consideration when working out the ratio (European Central Bank, 
2010).  
 
The European Central Bank (2010) suggests that ROA is a more accurate measure 
on efficiency performance since it adjusts for leverage. Studies suggest that ROE 
figures of pre-global financial crisis were approximately the same in the period 
following the crisis. However, some of the banks having high ROEs before the 
crisis were affected by a greater magnitude. This shows that ROE is a short-term 
signal which might be an inaccurate indicator of performance, especially in times 
of crisis. Nevertheless, ROA may be biased since it disregards income from off-
balance sheet activities (Flamini et al., 2009). Thus, it is recommended that both 
indicators should be considered. 
 
2.10 Measure for Liquidity 
 
Saeed (2014), in his paper of liquidity crisis, chose loans to deposit as a measure 
for liquidity since it shows the financial health of a bank. The higher the LTD 
means that a bank is relying more on borrowed funds, which sometimes are more 
costly than other of types of deposits. 
 
2.11 Measure for Efficiency 
 
Efficiency was used for the first time as a performance indicator in the works of 
Edgeworth (1881) and Pareto (1927) and was initially empirically used in 
Shephard’s (1953) book. Efficiency is defined as the ability to produce the 
maximum amount of output out of the minimal input of resources. A bank is 
efficient; if it is able to generate the highest revenues by using the least amount of 
resources.  
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The banks’ efficiency in this study is measured by means of the efficiency ratio, 
which is a widely used measure of a banks’ performance (Hays et al., 2009). It 
could be defined as the bank’s capability of transforming its resources into 
revenues. Efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing the bank’s total costs, omitting 
interest expenses, by its total revenue. The lower the ratio, the lower are the costs 
as a percentage of sales, hence higher efficiency (Hays et al., 2009). 
 
2.12 Governance and Performance 
 
Deloitte (2018) reported that various governance variables have a positive impact 
on the likelihood of firms’ improving their financial and operating performance. 
The most functional variables of ‘good’ governance are: 1) board independence, 2) 
demographic diversity, 3)  remuneration, 4) CEO characteristics, and 5) oversight 
and ownership structure (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Corporate Governance Variables and their effect on performance  
Governance Variable Impact on Performance 
 
 
Board Independence 
Higher number of independent members on the board 
increases board's capability to epitomize several points 
of view. However, when the size of the board 
increases, it slows down the decision-making process. 
 
Board Diversity 
Demographic diversity has a positive relationship 
with performance. However, being regulated 
diminishes this relationship effect. 
Remuneration Contributes by aligning interests between shareholders and 
management boosting performance. 
CEO Characteristics A powerful CEO, positively effects performance but also 
leads to more risk decisions. 
Oversight Active oversight role of owners and boards has a positive 
impact on performance. However, there is less 
attentiveness in times of prosperity. 
Ownership Structure Institutional ownership amplifies the quality of strategic 
decisions made by the board, by actively adding an 
outside perspective. 
Source: Adopted from Deloitte, 2018. 
 
In their study, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) analysed the relationship between 
corporate governance and profitability by studying confounding relationships of 
performance, capital structures, and ownership structure. The outcome showed that 
when there is good corporate governance, the companies attained better operating 
performance. Other factors affecting the relationship of performance and 
governance can relate positively to the legal framework and financial structure of 
a country. Anderson and Gupta (2009) conducted a cross-country study of financial 
structure and legal system. They took a sample of 1736 firms from 22 countries and 
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showed that the financial structure and legal system of a country have a joint 
impact on the relationship.  
 
Ueng (2016) analysed the link between the quality of governance policy and the 
firm’s financial performance. A sample of 3068 entities from a Corporate Library 
database was used. The outcome was similar to the previous studies, hence better 
corporate governance policies leads to better performance. JB (2017) analysed the 
correlation between governance and profitability of financial entities listed on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. The author found that the overall impact of higher 
governance on a companies’ profitability is negative. 
 
Some other studies analysed the relation between governance and financial 
performance by taking a closer look on board aspects, more specifically size, board 
independence and CEO roles. When addressing the number of members on the 
board and its relationship with performance, there are conflicting results in the 
literature. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that having a smaller number of 
members on the board allows for better and more effective decision-making. Based 
on this theory the authors suggested a proposal to limit the number of members to a 
maximum of ten. Yermack (1996) revealed that smaller boards are positively 
related with financial ratios; while to the contrary, Coles et al. (2008) highlight that 
a higher number of board members is ideal when the entity is large; is operating 
with high leverage and the board has important advisory roles. 
 
Other studies found a negative relationship between the board size and firm 
performance. The higher the members in a board, the less efficient an entity is. 
Leading to higher bureaucratic problems and increase time taken for decisions 
(Jensen, 1993). Moreover, other scholars argue that when the board becomes too 
large, it becomes difficult to coordinate to communicate and to participate. This 
would lead to a decrease in the company performance (Golden and Zajac, 2001).  
 
Bhagat and Black (2002), find that entities with more independent boards (as post 
crisis requirements on governance stipulate) are performing worse. Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008), found a negative association between board independence and firm 
performance. Bhagat and Bolton (2009), reported that having a higher board 
independence does not lead to excess performance and could lead to worse 
performance. Arun and Turner (2002), point out that the inefficiencies associated 
with bank management, are a major cause of strict regulatory pressures from 
authorities. Likewise, according to Boot and Thakor (1993), the interests of the 
shareholders of a bank, mainly the maximisation of the shareholder value, were not 
being met as the authors argue that regulatory authorities are being risk averse and 
their main concern is financial stability (Capiro and Levine, 2002).  
 
Saeed (2014), in his study on post crisis liquidity found that stricter liquidity 
regulations from the authorities led to banks decreasing drastically the LTD 
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ratio to maintain higher capital buffers. Furthermore, Grima and Spiteri (2019) 
found that lower leverage led to a ‘deposit-war’ between banks to attract more 
customers. This is because banks had to rely mainly on their deposits to perform 
loans, thus influencing negatively their profitability. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To carry out this study we used financial ratios and industry statistics. Panel data 
of ratios were collected for the period before and during the latest financial crisis 
(2006-2010) and for the period after regulations have been implemented (2014-
2018).  
 
A non-probability purposive sampling, using five independent/control variables 
for performance (profitability, liquidity and efficiency), were collected. We also 
followed this up with twenty-two interviews conducted with chief officers and 
executives from the banking sector within the region under study. The period 
chosen was regarded as ideal since it would capture the difficulties of the 
economy and would be beneficial to determine the difference in performance, 
since the post 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when more stringent requirements 
were being placed on Corporate Governance Principles.  
 
However, we decided to skip four years since during those years, most regulations 
were being amended and new ones were being enacted. Therefore, most entities were 
had not yet applied these requirements. As already noted, our focus was 
specifically on Public Banks within Spain, Italy, France, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal 
and Malta. 100, banks in total were found to be relevant to our research however 
only 61 of these provided the relevant data required. This met the minimum sample 
size required at 95% confidence level (Qualtrics, 2018) which was computed as 53. 
 
Table 2. Sample  
Country Number of Public Banks 
Cyprus 2 
France 16 
Greece 6 
Italy 19 
Malta 4 
Portugal 1 
Spain 5 
 
The data was collected using Thompson Reuters and from annual reports of the 
banks downloaded from the Banks’ websites or from the registrar of companies.  
This yearly data was then transferred onto Microsoft Excel and SPSS to enable 
analysis. We used three ratios to measure profitability: 
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a) The Return on Assets (ROA) to measure the return on investments and 
retained capital. 
b) The Return on Equity (ROE) which measures performance by dividing net 
income by the closing equity value of shareholders.  
c) Net profit margin (NPM) to determine whether the management are 
returning adequate profit from sales and if total expenses are being 
efficiently catered for (Todorovic, 2017). The above three ratios were 
taken as measures for profitability. 
 
The Loan to deposit (LTD) ratio is used as a measure of a bank’s liquidity. An 
ideal loan to deposit ratio for a healthy banking system is between 80% and 90% 
(Murphy, 2019). The Efficiency ratio was taken as a control variable for a bank’s 
efficiency. It relates to the efficacy of the management to generate the highest 
return by the lowest possible costs. 
 
We decided to take both ROA and ROE even though they are both a measure 
of profitability, since ROA has been widely used to analyse profitability in models, 
however ROE has now gained higher distinction in recent studies. In this study, 
ROA was taken as a measure for operational profitability and ROE represented 
financial profitability. The structured interview was designed to tackle the 
following key areas of discussion with the following open-ended questions: 
 
➢ How do you perceive corporate governance to affect performance? 
➢ Do you believe the requirements imposed on banks to be harsh? 
➢ What in your opinion can be done to implement efficient governance 
practices? 
 
The interviews were transcribed into MS word and later analysed using the 
thematic approach as proposed by Braun et al. (2006). Moreover, we carried out 
the following tests on all the individual control variables (i.e. ROE, ROA, Net 
Profit Margin, Efficiency Ratio, and Loan to Deposit). 
 
Control Variables:  H0: No difference between the periods. 
                                H1: A decease between the periods. 
 
Once data was collected, an average was derived for both periods i.e. Period one, 
being the pre and during crisis and Period two being the period post crisis described 
above. Then the t-test was computed, using SPSS, to study the significance of the 
results.  
 
The second test computed, was the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. It is a test used 
for smaller sample sizes, mainly because this test assumes that with a small 
sample, the assumption of normality is violated (Spiteri, 2019). As such, this test 
was computed for each country for each variable.  
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4. Results and Discussions 
 
4.1 Profitability  
(a) Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Figure 1. Average yearly % Return on Assets in the EU Med Region. 
 
 
The computed t-test resulted significant with a t-test statistic of 4.35 and a p-value < 
0.05. Therefore, Ho can be rejected, meaning that a negative trend in operational 
performance exists between the two periods. 
 
(b) Return of Equity 
There is a huge drop from period one to period two. In fact, the computed mean 
ROE in the first period was 20.15% and that of period two was 4.69%. This means 
that in period two the management of the banks were less able to generate cash 
internally from the shareholders capital. The computed t-test result of 2.43 is 
significant with a p-value < 0.05. This lies outside the acceptance region (using 
the +-2 rule of thumb). We can therefore reject H0, meaning that the two periods 
are not the same and a downward trend in financial performance exists between 
both periods. 
 
(c) Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
NPM also decreased on average from period one to period two. Again, one could 
notice (in figure three) a boom in net profits in the year 2007 (39.13%) followed by 
a decline to 11.14% in the following year.  The computed average of net profit 
margin for period one was 21.83%, while that during period two was 10.78%. This 
means that in period two banks had a lower NPM as a percentage of sales. Hence, 
banks in period one was more profitable and more effective at converting revenue 
into actual profit.  
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Figure 2. Average yearly % Return on Equity in the EU Med Region. 
 
 
They seem to have had better control over their costs in period one compared to 
period two. This presents a higher risk for investors who invested in the banks in 
period two since they required higher margin of safety. The paired two-sample test 
shows a t-test result of 2.51 and a p-value < 0.05. We can therefore reject H0, 
meaning that the two periods are not the same and a downward trend in financial 
performance exists between both periods. 
 
Figure 3. Average yearly % Net profit Margin in the EU Med Region. 
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4.2 Liquidity: Loans to Deposits 
 
From the liquidity perspective, we can see a downward trend for Loans to deposits 
(LTD) in period two as opposed to period one. This was due to the revision of 
higher Liquidity Coverage ratio recommended in Basel III and transposed into the 
requirements for EU banks (Capital Requirement Directive). This requires EU 
banks to maintain a higher liquidity cover for unforeseen circumstances. In 2008 
and 2009, the LTD ratio exploded to a level of 207% and 204% respectively 
meaning that for every euro held in deposit, public banks in the EU Mediterranean 
region lent €2.07 and €2.04 respectively. This put banks into a serious liquidity 
problem, which led to the Liquidity and Credit Crisis. In period two LTD ratio was 
less than 100% meaning that banks were lending from their deposit accounts, 
without borrowing additional funds (Grima et al., 2019; Camilleri et al., 2019; 
Mazreku et al., 2018) 
 
Grima et al. (2019), in their study, found that this led to a ‘deposit-war’ between 
banks to attract customer deposits. Besides, this had a negative impact on their 
profitability. The average for period one was 156.8%, while for period two it 
decreased to 90.8%. This clearly shows that banks maintained higher liquidity in 
period two. The evaluated t-test resulted as 1.92 (the t-test is very close to the +-2 
rule of thumb) with a significant p-value < 0.05. The H0 is therefore rejected 
meaning that in period two the liquidity is higher. 
 
Figure 4. Average yearly % Loans to Deposits in the EU Med Region 
 
 
4.3 Efficiency: Efficiency ratio 
 
The Efficiency ratio relates to the ability of management to turn inputs into sales 
with the lower possible costs. As can be seen from figure 5, the efficiency ratio 
increased from period one to period two in the EU Mediterranean region. This 
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meant that banks were less efficient in period two when compared to the previous 
period. Precisely the mean efficiency ratio in period one was 60.8% while in period 
two it rose to 69%. In other words, it can be said that costs as a percentage of sales 
were higher in the period where regulations were revised. This went hand in hand 
with the issue that Lux and Piechocki (2015) explained. That is, that the burden of 
compliance and reporting is becoming too time-consuming, hence making banks 
perform less efficiently. An ideal efficiency ratio would have been 50%, however 
in banks this value tends to be higher.  
 
The t-value of -4.56 lies in the rejection region as it is greater than the critical value 
and is significant at a p-value < 0.05. Hence the H0 is rejected. Therefore, we can 
conclude that between period one and period two a strong difference exists. 
Efficiency has thus decreased significantly from the first to the second period. 
 
Figure 5. Average yearly % Efficiency Ratio in the EU Med Group 
 
 
4.4 Analysis by Country 
  
a) Cyprus 
In Cyprus, all of our control variable taken for profitability show a decline between 
period one and two [ROE (-10.80%), ROA (-0.87%) and NPM (-26.69%)]. On the 
other hand, Liquidity improved as was expected prior to analysing results, due to 
higher liquidity requirements imposed by regulations. The LTD ratio decreased to 
82% in period two, as opposed to the huge 646% in period one - meaning that in 
period one public banks in Cyprus lent €6.46 for every euro of deposit held in 
account. The banks gave out loans by borrowing with high interest rates in the 
hope of earning higher rates from giving out loans.  
 
The Efficiency ratio also increased, meaning that costs as a percentage of sales 
were higher in period two. Thus, it can be concluded that in period two public, 
banks in Cyprus were less efficient as a result of the regulations imposed. 
Although results were all as expected, the p-values resulted to be insignificant 
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(p=0.18). This may be due to the small sample extracted for public banks in 
Cyprus. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 
b) France 
ROE decreased from 10.35% in period one to 8.04% in period two. Operational 
Performance also decreased from 1.09% to 0.90% as represented by the ROA. 
NPM, however, went against our expectations since in period two it increased to 
22.47%. This means that in period two public banks in France managed to control 
their costs better despite higher regulations imposed. All the above-mentioned 
results have strong z-tests and are all highly significant at all levels considering that 
their p-values are almost equal to zero. The null hypothesis (H0) is disregarded, 
hence failing to reject the alternative hypothesis (H1). 
 
Liquidity also improved in period two. This is because fewer loans were given for 
every euro of deposit held. In period two, €0.89 loans were given for every €1 held. 
This was €0.10 less loans given for every euro held in period one. The magnitude 
of the z-test (-2.844) calculated by the Wilcoxon sample paired test is higher 
than the rule of thumb. The negative sign of the z-stat shows that in period two 
the LTD ratio was lower when compared to the benchmark period. The p-value of 
0.004 is considered as highly significant at all levels (99%, 95% confidence 
intervals). The null hypothesis is rejected and hence there is a negative trend of 
LTD ratio between the periods. 
 
The efficiency ratio also met our assumption by increasing in the second period, 
resulting in lower efficiency. This result is highly significant at all levels with a p-
value of 0.002 and a z-score of -3.154, which shows a strong statistical test. The 
alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted, i.e. efficiency worsened following 
regulatory pressures on governance. 
 
(c) Greece 
Greece was one of the most severely hit by the crisis. The Greek-government debt 
crisis in 2009 led to a serious drop in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
country. Greece continues to suffer from this depression even today, in the form of 
high debts. With respect to profitability, public banks in Greece, suffered a huge 
drop in the mean % values of period two. ROE recorded a mean of 4.35% in the 
second period dropping from a mean 21.87%. ROA declined below zero, meaning 
that public banks in Greece experienced negative returns on assets in the second 
period.  
 
NPM followed the same trend as ROA, by registering a negative score (-10.64%). 
ROA’s results are significant with a p-value of 0.046. However, this cannot be said 
for ROE and NPM since their p-values are greater than 0.05. In this case the 
null hypothesis (H0) cannot be rejected, hence we cannot distinguish between 
period one and period two. Public banks in Greece loaned out €1.40 for every euro 
held in deposits during the first period. This diminished to €0.79 for every euro held 
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in period two, showing an improvement in their liquidity by almost 50% in the 
second period. 
 
Moreover, there was a registered increase in the efficiency ratio between the 
periods. The second period recorded an efficiency ratio of 63.26%. When 
compared to the first period, the costs as a percentage of sales were 
approximately 14% higher in period two. However, for both liquidity and efficiency, 
the computed z-score and p-value shows statistical insignificance for these 
results. Again, this insignificance is most probably the result of a small sample. 
 
d) Italy 
During the crisis, Italy experienced an 8% drop in GDP in 2008 (3% more than the 
euro zone). This led to the EU authorities to keep a close eye on the Italian banking 
system. Italian public banks faced diminishing profitability averages. ROE 
averaged 28.63% in period one. This value diminished to an average of 1.66% in 
the second period. This shows that the management of banks were less capable to 
generate cash from shareholders’ equity in period two. ROA in period one was 
1.78% and in the second period, this decreased to -0.30%. Both ROE and ROA are 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.018 and 0.011 respectively (p<0.05). Z-
scores for both ROE (-2.374) and ROA (-2.535) show that period two was lower 
than period one (represented by the negative sign) and the size is higher than the 
rule of thumb. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and accept the 
alternative (H1).  
 
Although NPM registered a decrease in the second period, this result is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level (p=0.126). On the other hand, 
the LTD ratio decreased in period two, from 114.52% to 98.61%. This shows that 
the Italian public banks in the second period gave out less loans for every euro held 
in account, as a result of the revised regulations. This improved the liquidity 
position of banks in period two. This result is highly significant at all levels with a 
p-value of 0.003 and z-score of -3.018 (z>2). Therefore, the alternative hypothesis 
(H1) (i.e. that liquidity improved after regulatory pressures on corporate 
governance) cannot be rejected. 
 
The Efficiency ratio increased in the second period making the banks less efficient 
in this period. That is, as a result of revised regulations on governance, costs as a 
percentage of sales increased. This result is significant with p=0.009. 
 
e) Malta 
ROE decreased from 21.56% to 7.26% and ROA followed the same direction, with 
a drop in period two to 0.52%. The p-value = 0.068, which is statistically 
significant at (p<0.1) (Cowles and Davis, 1982). NPM declined by a lower 
magnitude. Hence, there was no difference between the periods. The p-
value=0.465. The loans to deposits ratio show that in Malta, public banks were 
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giving lower loans for every euro held on account during period one (€0.72 for 
every euro). However, in period two banks lent €0.85 for every €1 held on deposit 
accounts. This meant that banks in Malta where more cautious in period one and 
the regulatory pressures after the crisis enabled Maltese public banks to give out 
more loans for every euro held on account. The p-value = 0.715, which makes it 
insignificant. 
 
Efficiency in Maltese public banks also plunged. This was seen in the increase in 
the efficiency ratio, which in period one was 58.68% and increased to 74.74% in 
period two. This increase in efficiency ratio portrayed an increase in costs as a 
percentage of sales after authorities in the EU revised regulations on governance. 
The p-value of 0.068 is significant at a p-value < 0.01. 
 
f) Spain 
Public banks in Spain experienced a decrease in profitability from period one to 
period two. ROE decreased from 18.09% to 10.53%. This decrease is significant 
with a p-value of 0.043. Z-score is computed as -2.023, which magnitude is greater 
than our rule of thumb (+-2) and the sign represents the drop in period two when 
compared to period one. We therefore reject the null hypothesis (H0), meaning that 
ROE decreased from period one to period two. Although ROA and NPM declined 
in period two, these results are not significant at p-value=0.138 and 0.345 
respectively. To this effect, we could not reject the null hypothesis (H0). This 
means that there is no difference between both periods. 
 
LTD decreased during the second period to 94.49% from 401.31% in the first 
period. This represented a higher liquidity position of the banks. This value is 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.043. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) can be accepted. Thus, liquidity in period two was better than in 
period one. 
 
In addition, the Efficiency Ratio soared from 59.82% to 68.60% during the periods. 
This denoted that public banks in Spain performed less efficiently in period two. 
This increase is significant with a p-value of 0.043 and a z-test of -2.023. The null 
hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, meaning that efficiency was worse in period two. 
 
g) Portugal 
Here only one bank was deemed to be fit this study. To this effect, all outcomes are 
insignificant P-value>0.1. However, with regards to profitability and liquidity, 
Portugal followed the same trend, similar to the other countries in this study.  
Despite this, the same cannot be said with regards to efficiency ratio. This is 
because this bank seemed to be more efficient in period two (period 1 - 63.98% and 
period 2 - 60.32%). 
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4.5 Perspectives of Interviewees  
 
The interviewees (22/22) agreed that, 1) failures in Governance were a significant 
cause of the crisis; 2) performance related pay instead of decreasing the agency 
problem, actually encouraged higher short-term risk taking; 3) boards and senior 
management failed to understand the complexity of banking transactions example 
derivatives and the high exposure that their entity was running into. They 
highlighted that most board members did not provide the necessary oversight or 
control over management. Shareholders, in turn, pressured for higher share prices, 
which led to banks taking excessive risks. Regulators failed to capture low 
probability-high severity incidents example credit rating of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs). Moreover, regulators failed to supervise how financial 
information was produced and measures to safeguard integrity were not enough. 
 
Particularly, (10/22) interviewees argued that, “Regulations on governance have 
become excessive. We moved from one extreme to another”. Prior to the crisis, the 
regulatory frameworks focused on profitability while ignoring severity. Presently 
the emphasis is on severity and overseeing profitability. This means that nowadays 
depositors are overprotected (deposit guarantee schemes, higher capital buffers) 
to detriment of banks losing a large proportion of investors (since they opt to 
invest elsewhere, in a less regulated environment).  
 
Regulations have become fixed for all banks, whether large or small, without the 
application of the principle of proportionality enacted in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
Other interviewee (15/22) argued that “in the aftermath of the crisis, regulatory 
changes in the field of corporate governance in particular, were pretty drastic and 
may not have been as proportional as desired”. To this effect, banks incur a fixed 
and significant compliance cost. Hence, a bank needs to have the necessary critical 
mass in business activity to cover for these costs. Therefore, the impact on smaller 
banks is very high and sometimes business activity becomes unfeasible. 
Performance has been adversely affected by higher regulatory costs. In the short-
term there is a trade-off between profitability and liquidity, however, in the long-
term these two converge.  
 
Lack of liquidity would eventually lead to lower profitability and a company that is 
not profitable in the end, would find it difficult to raise the necessary funding. 
High liquidity buffers are eroding away the opportunity of reaping higher returns. 
Efficiency has decreased because banks are putting more attention (resources) on 
who their customers are, through a series of controls such as customer due 
diligence. These processes take time and time is money for every entity, this is why 
the costs as a percentage of sales are getting out of control. Moreover, all the 
interviewees (22/22) agreed that the regulations should follow the principle of 
proportionality and deliver the right balance with a fair and safe return to investors 
in accordance to their appetite and tolerance levels.  
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Sixteen interviewees (16/22) in fact noted that; “too much regulation will just drive 
business from regulated entities to newly formed but unregulated entities”. This is 
because the increment in costs are transferred to the client. Furthermore, they note 
that effectiveness is achieved through the integrity and collective effort of those 
involved. It is useless having strict regulations to have a robust corporate 
governance framework without appraising the people involved.  
 
They highlight that to appraise the human element in corporate governance; one 
needs to keep in mind the following two adages: (1) the past is not a mirror of the 
future and (2) not all that glitters is gold. Hence, the main objective of a bank is to 
deliver adequate training together with remuneration of good personnel to obtain 
the desired levels of efficiency, which ultimately leads to better performance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Using panel data of ratios of 53 banks from seven different countries in the EU 
Mediterranean region over the period between 2006-2010 (regarded as pre and 
during crisis) and between 2014-2018 (taken as the period post regulatory pressures 
on governance), we studied the key regulations imposed on governance and their 
effects on the performance of public banks. Italian, French, Greek, Portuguese, 
Spanish and Cypriot banks have been involved in an economic depression and 
credit crunch and many parties blame this on the ineffectiveness of governance. 
European authorities have therefore intervened by issuing new regulations on 
governance, whilst updating flaws in the existing. 
 
This had some repercussions on the overall performance of public banks in the EU 
Mediterranean region. As one could see, from the data analysis above, profitability 
decreased significantly from period one to period two. Thus, one can conclude that 
profitability was negatively affected with corroborates to the findings in the studies 
carried out by Bhagat and Bolton (2009) and JB (2017).  
 
In the year of the crisis (2007), one could notice a high profitability trend. In 
addition, however, 2014 was one of the worst years in terms of profitability for 
public banks in the EU Mediterranean region. This was exactly after the 
implementation of new governance requirements. When we looked at the 
individual countries, we noted a downward trend in profitability in most of the 
cases.   
 
Interviewees supported our findings by arguing that the regulators are being too 
strict, and regulations imposed have moved from one extreme to another impacting 
adversely banks’ profitability. However, nowadays, banks know their customers 
and are making profits supposedly without the risk of losing their reputation. 
Liquidity improved after the regulatory pressures and the LTD ratio decreased 
significantly in the second period. This corroborates to the findings of Saeed (2014) 
and Grima et al. (2019), who reported that stricter liquidity regulations led to banks 
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decreasing drastically the LTD ratio, to maintain higher capital buffers. 
Interviewees claimed that this high liquidity coverage ratio is one of the main 
causes of decreasing profitability as it is making banks lose opportunity to earn 
higher profits.  
 
Efficiency plummeted significantly in period two. This theory followed what Arun 
and Turner (2002), reported in their paper, suggesting that the inefficiencies 
associated with bank management, is a major cause of strict regulatory pressures. 
This is also due to higher compliance costs incurred as a percentage of sales. This 
finding also corroborates to the works of Lux and Piechocki (2015), who reported 
that the burden of compliance and reporting is becoming too costly and time-
consuming. 
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